

CASE LAW UPDATES

# Case Brief: Madras Bar Association v Union of India

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Can Parliament simply re-enact a law that courts have already struck down, without fixing the actual defects? This exact question sat at the heart of the Supreme Court's landmark ruling on the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021.

This case brief on Madras Bar Association v Union of India covers the facts, issues, arguments, holding, and ratio, following the standard case brief format used in prep courses and legal research.

## **Citation and Bench of Madras Bar Association v Union of India**

**Case Name:** Madras Bar Association v Union of India and Another

**Citation:** 2025 INSC 1330

**Court:** Supreme Court of India

**Decided On:** November 19, 2025

**Bench:** Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran

You can read the earlier related judgment, [Madras Bar Association v Union of India \(2021\)](#), and refer to [Section 3](#) of [The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021](#) for the actual provisions discussed below.

## **Facts of Madras Bar Association v. Union of India**

Tribunals in India function as specialised adjudicatory bodies handling disputes in areas like taxation, company law, and administrative service matters. Their independence from executive influence has been litigated repeatedly over the past decade, through a long line of cases

collectively known as the Madras Bar Association series.

In *Union of India v R. Gandhi* (2010), the first case in this series, the Court held that tribunal members must enjoy the same independence and stature as the judges they replace. This principle was reaffirmed in *Madras Bar Association* (2014), *Madras Bar Association* (2015), and *Rojer Mathew v Union of India* (2019).

In 2020, the Central Government notified fresh rules on tribunal appointments, which the Court struck down in *Madras Bar Association v Union of India* (2020), commonly called MBA-IV, for failing to ensure judicial dominance in the selection process. The government then issued the *Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021*, which the Court also struck down on July 14, 2021, in the judgment reported as (2021) 7 SCC 369, commonly called MBA-V.

Weeks after that ruling, Parliament enacted the *Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021*. The Madras Bar Association, along with the Central Administrative Tribunal Bar Association, challenged this new Act, arguing it was essentially the same struck down ordinance reintroduced through legislation.

## **<strong>Procedural History</strong>**

The petitioners filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court in 2021, shortly after the Act was notified. The Union of India, during the hearings, urged the Court to refer the matter to a larger bench, arguing the constitutional questions deserved fresh reconsideration.

The two judge Bench declined this request, holding that the Union had provided no cogent or compelling reason for a reference, since the substantial questions of law had already been examined in detail across the *Madras Bar Association* judgments of 2010, 2014, 2015, 2020, and 2021, along with *Rojer Mathew*.

## **<strong>Issues</strong>**

1. Whether Parliament can validly re-enact provisions that the Supreme Court has already struck down, without curing the underlying constitutional defects.
2. Whether Section 3(1) of the Act, fixing a minimum age of fifty years for appointment as Chairperson or Member, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

3. Whether Section 3(7), requiring the Search-cum-Selection Committee to recommend two names for each vacancy, undermines judicial independence and separation of powers.
4. Whether the fixed four year tenure, combined with upper age limits, compromises the security of tenure necessary for judicial independence.
5. Whether the composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee, and the executive's role in appointments, violates the requirement that judicial voices remain dominant in tribunal appointments.

### **<strong>Arguments of the Petitioners</strong>**

The petitioners argued that the impugned Act was a word for word reproduction of the earlier ordinance that had already been declared unconstitutional in *MBA-V*. They contended that fixing a minimum age of fifty years excluded competent younger advocates who had already completed the required ten years of practice, thereby violating Article 14.

They further argued that a four year tenure, shorter than the five years directed in earlier judgments, combined with a frequent churn of members, damaged institutional memory and continuity within tribunals. The provision requiring two names to be recommended for each post was challenged as diluting the Selection Committee's actual decision making authority in favour of the executive.

### **<strong>Arguments of the Union of India</strong>**

The Union defended the Act as a valid exercise of Parliament's legislative competence, distinct from the earlier ordinance since it had been passed through the full legislative process rather than an executive ordinance. It argued that administrative considerations, such as managing tribunal budgets and ensuring uniformity across different tribunals, justified provisions like the fixed tenure and age requirements.

The Union also urged that the constitutional questions be referred to a larger bench for fresh consideration, given the significance of the issues involved.

### **<strong>Holding</strong>**

The Supreme Court struck down the key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, holding as follows.

**On legislative override:** The Court held that while Parliament has the competence to legislate on this subject, it cannot use that competence to effectively nullify a binding judicial decision by re-enacting the very same provisions without curing their constitutional defects. Justice Vinod Chandran, in his concurring opinion, remarked that the Act was "old wine in a new bottle," since the bottle may look different but the substance remained unchanged.

**On Section 3(1), the minimum age requirement:** The Court held that barring appointment of anyone below fifty years of age was arbitrary and violated Article 14, since it excluded advocates who already possessed the requisite ten years of practice experience purely on the basis of age, with no rational connection to competence.

**On Section 3(7), the two name requirement:** The Court held that requiring the Search-cum-Selection Committee to recommend two names for every vacancy, rather than a single clear recommendation, diluted the Committee's own authority and gave the executive an effective choice in appointments, contrary to the principle that judicial members must have a decisive voice.

**On tenure and age caps:** The Court found that a four year tenure, shorter than the five years previously directed, combined with upper age limits of 67 for members and 70 for chairpersons, compromised the security of tenure essential to judicial independence.

**On the National Tribunals Commission:** The Court directed the Union of India to constitute a National Tribunals Commission within four months from the date of the judgment. This Commission is meant to act as an independent body overseeing the appointment, functioning, and disciplinary matters of tribunal members across the country, insulating these processes from direct executive control.

**On interim governance:** The Court clarified that until a constitutionally compliant statute is enacted, the directions and principles laid down in MBA-IV and MBA-V shall continue to govern all matters relating to appointment, qualification, tenure, and service conditions of tribunal members and chairpersons.

**<strong>Ratio Decidendi</strong>**

Parliament's legislative competence to enact a law does not extend to reversing the effect of a binding judicial decision by simply re-enacting the same unconstitutional provisions in a new statute. Where a law is found to be a substantial repetition of previously invalidated provisions, without addressing the specific constitutional infirmities identified by the Court, it amounts to an impermissible legislative override and remains unconstitutional.

Judicial independence of tribunals, including secure tenure, a judicially dominant selection process, and freedom from arbitrary executive control, forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be diluted for reasons of administrative convenience.